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ABSTRACT
In the face of growing competition and the commoditization in the Tantalum Wire
business, H.C. Starck must find a way to differentiate their wire products from
competitors in order to survive in this market.
This thesis studies the possibility of developing a new product into the market by
launching a product development process, with the goal of gaining a competitive
advantage and sustaining it, thus increasing profitability over time. For this purpose a
decision support model was developed to analyze the economical and operational
feasibility of a new product. All aspects of launching a new product development process
in H.C. Starck Wire department were modeled to simulate uncertainties across the
Tantalum supply-chain, and recommendations were drawn based on results.
A number of goals were addressed in this study: First, a robust link was created between
the scientific potential and the economical potential of a new wire development. Second,
a recommended strategy was defined for H.C.Starck Wire department in order to
differentiate their products in lieu of low cost competition.
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Thesis Supervisor: Sharon Novak
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Thesis Objective
The objective of this thesis is to analyze and improve upon the product development
process of the next generation Tantalum wire product, which will be designed and
manufactured in H.C. Starck Inc. (a wholly owned subsidiary of Bayer Material Science
Company) in Newton, Massachusetts. The focus of this analysis is on aligning the
product development process with the forecasted financial indicators of this product (i.e.
future profitability, capital investment, cost structure etc).
This work is the product of collaboration between H. C. Starck and the Leaders for
Manufacturing program at MIT. The data presented in this thesis was collected in the
wire manufacturing facility of H. C. Starck in Newton, Massachusetts.
1.2 Problem Statement
H.C. Starck manufactures both Tantalum wire and Tantalum powder, both of which are
used in the production of Tantalum Capacitors. The Tantalum wire supply chain includes
Tantalum ore mining, Tantalum wire and powder manufacturing (by H.C. Starck),
Tantalum capacitors production, and finally the capacitors being used in products such as
electronics (cell phones, PDAs), automotive, military and medical products. Since 2000,
the Tantalum wire market has operated as a commodity market, where competitors
manufacture similar products, competing mostly on price. In order to effectively compete
in this market and maintain future profits, H.C Starck needs to gain a competitive
advantage that will be sustainable in the face of tough cost competition from China. H.C
Starck can utilize its reputation and skill in technology leadership and innovation to
develop a new Tantalum wire product that will enable the industry to move to higher-
capacitance Tantalum capacitors, in which both Tantalum wire & powder act as
components. These capacitors will support the ongoing electronics industry trend of
increased miniaturization and speed, as evident in the high growth rates for cell phones,
PDAs, wireless products and similar products. There is a significant first mover
advantage for such a product, and speed to market should enable a significant market
share gain, as well as a price premium advantage. However, product development for the
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next generation Tantalum wire product cannot be initiated as an independent process. It
has to be directly linked to the business aspects of new product development: required
capital investments for R&D, potential revenues and profits in years to come, forecasted
product sales, and current cost structure. The product development process must also be
linked to the operational aspects of a new product - available manufacturing capacity on
floor, product mix of all wire products, capacity utilization, as well as available labor and
other constraints. When facing such a strategic crossroad, H.C. Starck needs to develop a
decision support model that will consider multiple 'what-if scenarios and will assist in
making informed financial and operational decisions before launching a new product
development effort that is both capital and time intensive. Such a model was developed
and is described in detail in this thesis. This model supports H.C Starck by providing an
ROI & profitability analysis under uncertain market conditions. The model was linked to
the new product development process to optimize schedule and cost aspects. In addition
to this model, H.C Stack also needs to resolve a technical issue with the new Tantalum
wire product. This issue is faced by their customers and is gating the high-volume
production and sales of the high capacitance wire/powder combination. Therefore, H.C.
Starck will need to evaluate several technology sources within the product development
process. While the model developed has focused on Tantalum wire, a comprehensive
business case must include both wire and powder.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This thesis has four main sections. Sections 1 and 2 include introductory and background
material describing the setting for this research. Section 3 includes a summary of the
results achieved, and section 4 provides conclusions and recommendations.
For reasons of confidentiality some data (including volumes, forecasts, etc.) in this thesis
has been disguised.
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Chapter 2: SETTING AND PROBLEM STATEMENT ANALYSIS
In this chapter the business environment of Tantalum is reviewed, with special emphasis
on the Tantalum supply chain and the major market forces influencing it. First, the key
players in the Tantalum supply chain are individually introduced and described in the
context of their position in the supply chain. Second, a generic framework to assess
market attractiveness is reviewed, and third, the entire Tantalum Wire market is assessed
for its attractiveness using this framework. This chapter concludes by analyzing different
strategic responses the company can execute in order to improve its position within the
Tantalum Wire market, and a recommended strategy is offered.
2.1 Setting
The research for this thesis was conducted at the wire manufacturing facility of H. C.
Starck Inc. (a wholly owned subsidiary of Bayer Material Science Group) in Newton,
Massachusetts, from June through December 2005. Founded by two MIT grads, H.C.
Starck (formerly NCR) is a major international producer of Tantalum and Niobium
products for the electronic, semiconductor, chemical, pharmaceutical and other
specialized industries. Capacitor grade tantalum wire is a critical component in the
manufacture of capacitors for the electronics industry. A leader in the global passive
electronic components industry since its inception, H.C. Starck has continued to maintain
its strong position through its high quality product offerings in challenging applications -
applications that continue to shrink their product life cycle and increase their technical
complexities due mainly to the boom in electronic applications and distribution.
2.2 Company overview
In the 1980s, H.C. Starck GmbH was purchased by Bayer AG (Germany), and H.C.
Starck Inc. became a wholly owned subsidiary of H.C. Starck. The majority of H.C
Starck's production comes from their manufacturing facilities in Germany, Japan and the
United States. The company is organized into five different business groups aligned with
the industry and customers they serve: Hard Metals (HM), Chemicals and Mill products
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(CH), Electronics and Optics (EO), Surface technology and advanced ceramics (OK), and
Fabricated Products (FP). Two of these business units operate at the Newton site;
Electronics and Optics (EO) and Fabricated Parts (FP). Chart 1 describes H.C Starck's
.. ....
organizational structure within Bayer, and the Tantalum Wire department within it:
Chart 1: Bayer and H.C. Starck Organizational Structure
The Newton site also houses a consolidated site services group for plant functions such as
Human Resources, Accounting, Engineering, Quality Control and Safety. The EO group
is primarily responsible for the production of Tantalum powder and tantalum wire, while
the FP group is primarily responsible for the production of fabricated tantalum parts such
as alloy additives and sputtering targets. The Newton wire department is responsible for
research and development activities as well as the production of Tantalum and Niobium
wire. The Newton wire facility is the only wire manufacturing facility at H. C. Starck (i.e.
a single source for Tantalum wire). While Tantalum's end markets are diverse and consist
of Tantalum capacitors, military applications, chemical industry and others, the Tantalum
wire products are not as diverse and are mostly sold to capacitor manufacturers (more
than 90% of total volume) with a small quantity sold to medical implants companies.
2.3 Tantalum
Anders Gustav Ekeberg of Sweden, using an ore sample, discovered tantalum in 1802.
He named the newly discovered element after King Tantalus of Phrygia, from the Greek
mythology, who was condemned to eternal frustration by standing up to his neck in water
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that receded when he tried to drink it. Ekeberg shared King's Tantalus frustration when
he tried to isolate Tantalum.
Tantalum is a rare metal, gray in color, and possesses several unique characteristics:
o High temperature resistance (melting point: 2996 degrees C)
o Excellent corrosion resistance to most acids & organics
o Has a very high density
o Good conductor of heat & electricity
o Ductile
o Easily fabricated
o Excellent dielectric properties (Tantalum Oxide)
These unique physical properties along with its high cost determine its application.
Its exceptional dielectric properties lead to a very high volumetric efficiency, capacitance
and reliability, which make it a good candidate for capacitors. These Tantalum capacitors
distinguish themselves from other types of capacitors (i.e. Aluminum and Ceramic) by a
very high volumetric efficiency of capacitance (thus their ability to carry a greater
capacitance in a smaller device volume), as well as a greater reliability under extreme
conditions of stress and temperature (thus they are ideal for automotive applications
where 'under-hood' temperatures can cause other capacitors to fail).
Tantalum's corrosion-resistant characteristic, similar to glass, is ideal for chemical
processing, and makes it one of the best materials for body implants. Tantalum improves
the refractive index of lenses to make them thinner, and it provides X-rays with a brighter
2image, while reducing the radiation dosage to the patient.
2.4 The Tantalum Business Environment
2.4.1 Tantalum Wire Supply Chain
The Tantalum wire supply chain is relatively long and complex. It originates from
Tantalum Ore in a mine and finished in a consumer end product such as a cell phone, a
laptop, a PDA or a car. Chart 2 represents a simplified Tantalum wire supply chain. The
upcoming section will describe the role of each player in the supply chain in greater
detail.
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Chart 2: A simplified Tantalum Wire supply chain flow
The following section describes the key players in the Tantalum Wire supply chain, their
respective roles and their relative contribution to the entire supply chain complexity. The
players are described in the same order as in the supply chain - from the most upstream
level (raw material suppliers) to the most downstream level (end customers).
Tantalum ore miners: Mining companies extract the Tantalum minerals that are found
in limited locations worldwide, as indicated by chart 3 below. Most Tantalum mines
today are of the 'Hard Rock' type, which requires a significant capital investment and
usually takes two to three years to be brought to market. These companies sell the
Tantalum ore to the powder and wire processors (companies like H.C. Starck and others)
through long-term 'take or pay' contracts3. The largest active mines for Tantalum are
hard rock mines in Australia. Chart 3 maps the Tantalum raw material sources:
"mica
aas
OMlER
Chart 3: Sources of Tantalum mines worldwide
Nearly 20% of the Tantalum powder and wire source comes from recycled scrap, since
the Tantalum scrap recovery during the manufacturing process is close to 100%. This
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source of tantalum is significantly cheaper than purchasing Tantalum extracts from the
mining companies, however its limited availability prohibits it from being sourced at
more than 20% of raw materials.
Between 1999 and 2001, illegal tantalum mining in the Kahuzi-Biega National Park in
Africa partially financed the civil war in the Congo. In response to the crisis in the
Congo, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution in September 2001 that
banned the purchase of tantalum from the Congo. Tantalum's price skyrocketed with a
price increase of ten-fold within several months, in the face of distorted news stories
about shortages. Slogans like "Blood Tantalum" and "No Blood on my Mobile," became
haunting symbols of the scramble for tantalum among major corporations that locked in
astronomically high contract prices for future delivery of the rare metal from legitimate
sources. In June 2003, The UN Security Council issued a statement on the "Illegal
exploitation of natural resources and others forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo." In that statement, the panel of experts recorded the reactions of
individuals, corporations and countries involved in the tantalum business.
Powders and Wire Processors: Companies like H.C. Starck and its competitors
purchase the Tantalum ore, concentrate it, refine it into an oxide, convert the oxide into a
chemical compound (K2TaF7) and then reduce the K2 to the pure metal form of
Tantalum. They manufacture Tantalum powder and wire for multiple end markets, the
majority of which is dedicated to Tantalum capacitors, as detailed in chart 4 below:
Chemical process
Sputtering 1%
Others Military 5%
2% 2%
Carbides
10% Super-alloy
9%
Other Electronics &
Optics
10%
Capacitor
products
61%
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Chart 4: Tantalum end-markets demand per industry
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the cell phone, communications, Internet and
computer markets all witnessed double-digit growth rates (this era was also known as the
'NASDAQ boom' and the 'Dot Com' period). These events had a significant impact on
the Tantalum supply chain, as a perceived shortage of Tantalum capacitors was
highlighted by the press, and contributed to a surge in Tantalum capacitor prices. This
shortage was extremely overestimated. In 2001 the entire tantalum capacitor market
collapsed along with the electronics industry, as the market 'discovered' that the actual
demand was much lower than had been anticipated and the Tantalum supply chain was
left with enormous amounts of excess inventory (from raw materials to finished goods) 4.
The market collapse of 2001 began a price war at a level previously unseen in the
industry. Unfortunately this effect will probably not fade away. On top of excess
inventory in the supply chain, several new Tantalum wire producers from China entered
the market post-2001 and contributed to the price war by offering their products below
the average market price 5. The actions of the Chinese firms resulted from having a lower
cost structure as well as a strategic move to gain market share undercutting prices. The
Chinese lower cost structure originated from the lower labor rates in China as well as
from pursuing a different raw material sourcing strategy - buying raw Tantalum in the
open spot-market without the long term contract obligations. This sourcing strategy
resulted in a lower raw Tantalum price, however with greater risk due to pricing volatility
in the spot market. Chinese companies also purchased raw Tantalum from countries in
Africa (mainly Congo) that were boycotted by western companies due to social reasons
described above. In order to maintain their level of market share and prevent a loss of
their customer base, the non-Chinese incumbents in the Tantalum Wire market responded
to the new entrants by matching the lower prices offered by the Chinese firms, thus
cutting their own margins significantly. As a result of the price war, the average
Tantalum wire selling price ($/Lb) has been going down consistently since 2000, and is
predicted to continue to drop. The price war has placed tremendous pressure on wire
producers to reduce cost in ways they had not faced before. Chart 5 demonstrates the
trend in Tantalum wire selling price over time.
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Chart 5: H.C. Starck's Tantalum Wire selling price ($/Lb) trends
Capacitor Manufacturers:
As shown in chart 4, most Tantalum wire is sold to capacitor manufacturing companies,
therefore these manufacturers have a very strong influence on the Tantalum wire market
health. However, capacitor manufacturers do not independently determine the volume of
capacitor production - they rely on the electronic industry. The electronic industry is very
important to the tantalum business, as more than 70% of tantalum material is used in
electronic end markets, and electronics thus greatly influence the entire Tantalum supply
chain. In fact, past data shows that when the electronics industry grows by 10%, the entire
tantalum supply chain must grow by 8%6. Few other supply chains are so greatly affected
by a single segment of their business 7. Chart 6 shows another key link between the
electronics industry to the tantalum business industry, as demonstrated by the correlation
between the electronics equipment market (in $K) to the amount of Tantalum capacitors
needed; The chart indicates that Tantalum capacitors became a greater part of the electronic
industry over time (roughly 20% increase in the ratio of Tantalum capacitors per Electronic
equipment shipments between 1992 to 2002).
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Chart 6: Ratio of Tantalum Capacitors to Electronic Equipment shipment
Original Eiuipment Manufacturers (OEMs): The capacitor makers sell their tantalum
capacitors to companies that manufacture end products such as cell phone producers (i.e.
Motorola, Nokia), PC/Laptop producers (i.e. Intel, AMD), automakers (i.e. Ford, GM),
military applications, etc. Some of these companies manufacture their products in-house,
while others outsource to Contract Service Manufacturers (CSMs),. Since these OEMs
directly interact with the end consumers (i.e. retailers & the mass public), they possess
the most accurate market intelligence in terms of trends, long range forecasts, as well as
strategic plans for new products. One of the challenges for other partners in the supply
chain, such as HC Starck, is communicating with these OEMs to better utilize this
knowledge for product development as well as production planning.
2.5 Tantalum Wire Market Attractiveness Analysis
2.5.1 Academic Literature Benchmark: Porter's Five Forces Framework
The essence of formulating a strategy is relating a company to its environment. Therefore
8
analyzing the external environment is a crucial phase in any strategic planning process.
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Many frameworks, tools and techniques have been developed to assess and evaluate the
external environment; however Michael Porter's Competitive Forces Model (commonly
referred to as Porter's Five Forces Model) is by far the most widely used framework for
'9an assessment of the profit potential in the industry, also called 'market attractiveness' .
Drawing on rich body of theoretical and empirical research in the subfield of economics
known as Industrial Organization, Porter demonstrated the importance of understanding
the firm's industry and its competitive position within itl0. All five forces jointly
determine the intensity of the industry competition and profitability, as shown in chart 7
below. This thesis utilizes Porter's Five Forces framework in order to highlight the
structural features which collectively impact the profit potential of the Tantalum Wire
market.
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Chart 7: Porter's Five Forces framework for market attractiveness assessment
2.5.2. Implementing Porter's Framework in the Tantalum Wire Market
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The following section reviews each of Porter's five forces with regards to the Tantalum
Wire industry. Each force is first described generically for its intent and potential sources,
and then a specific analysis of the force is detailed in the context of the Tantalum Wire
industry, followed by a description of the sources of strengths and weaknesses in each
force. A qualitative score of Low/Medium/High was assigned for each of the forces to
signify its strength level in the Tantalum Wire industry.
The first force, Barriers To Entry, considers the likelihood that new firms will enter the
industry. Each industry possesses characteristics that protect the high profit levels of
firms in the market and inhibit additional rivals from entering the market. The barriers to
entry in the Tantalum Wire industry were concluded to be of medium strength, while
considering major components as capital requirements, intellectual property issues and
break even volume requirements. The initial capital investment needed to open a wire
factory based on current industry standards averages around $50 to 60 million dollars.
This is not a negligible amount, but is not considered significant for large corporations or
companies looking to expand their businesses. Any entrant to the Tantalum wire business
will need to gain sufficient technical knowledge in the engineering and manufacturing
processes, quality control, efficiency and more. However, since the Tantalum wire
manufacturing technology did not change much over the past decades, most patents have
either expired or have been licensed, to an extent where the wire technology is not
considered to be a very challenging one to obtain these days. Last, in order to achieve
positive profits in the Tantalum wire business, a manufacturing facility must run in a
minimum volume that will enable break-even profitability. This volume is measured in
wire pounds per year, and currently stands on an average of 100,000 Lbs/year as a
minimum point. This in fact is a barrier to entry since an entrant will need to obtain sales
in at least that volume before being profitable. These aspects combined were considered
to be of medium strength as a barrier to entry to the Tantalum Wire industry.
The second force, Buyer Power, considers the impact that customers have on a
producing industry. The major components that imply an existence of buyer power in an
industry are the buyer concentration level, the proportion of the output being purchased
by industry buyers, the level of product standardization (i.e. is close to or is a
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commodity), as well as any buyer switching costs. " The power of buyers in the
Tantalum Wire industry was concluded to be of high strength when considering the major
components above. First, Tantalum Wire products have become a commodity several
years ago when all producers started to manufacture the same quality and similarly
specified wires. To date there is no real differentiation between Ta wire made by different
producers in the industry, i.e. there is no sustainable advantage to companies like H.C.
Starck in their wire products. Second, in today's Ta wire market there is essentially no
switching costs associated with Ta wire manufacturers- a buyer (for example, a capacitor
producer like Vishay or Kemet) can easily switch between wire suppliers with no impact
to its business since the product is almost identical in all aspects. Third, more than 90%
of the Ta wire volume is sold to Ta capacitors manufacturers12 . This brings a lot of power
to the hands of the buyers as they have a significant influence over the wire industry
revenues and profits. Last, as described in the supply chain section above, the main
possession of brand power in this industry is positioned at the OEMs level... i.e the
household brand names like Nokia, Motorola, Intel, Ford, etc. These OEMs (who are the
2"d-teir buyers for the Ta wire makers) have a recognizable brand name and utilize it to
increase their market power, as apposed to wire makers like HC Starck who do not have
significant brand equity. These aspects combined indicate a high level of power
possessed by the Tantalum Wire industry buyers.
The third force, Supplier Power, considers the buyer-supplier relationship between the
industry and the firms that provide it with the raw materials used to create products.
Suppliers, if powerful, can exert an influence on the producing industry, such as selling
raw materials at a high price to capture some of the industry's profits' 3 . The major
components influencing supplier power in an industry are the supplier concentration
level, alternative sources of raw materials, the existence of long term contracts with
industry suppliers, and a credible forward integration threat. The power of suppliers in
the Tantalum Wire industry was concluded to be of medium strength when considering
the components above. First, the level of supplier concentration in the Tantalum Wire
industry is high, since the raw materials suppliers are the Ta mining companies - and
there are only a few of them controlling most of the market. This means that these mining
companies exert some power due to their low number and high market share. Second,
there is no real alternative to Tantalum extracts from mines; currently, most of the Ta raw
20
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material is produced from the Ta minerals via mining companies. Only a fraction of the
raw material is sourced via recycled Ta (less than 20%). Since there is no alternative
source on earth for raw Ta aside from the Ta mines, buyers of Ta like H.C. Starck and
others can not threaten to pursue other paths to get raw Ta and hence the supplier power
is increased. If the electronics market demand will grow and will require more Tantalum
capacitors, the raw material prices will rise and the profits will be captured most likely by
the mining companies. Third, in the past few years, long term contracts have become
standard procedure in the Ta market, where mining companies and Ta processors sign
contracts to ensure long term raw materials supply in standard pricing. Terminating such
contract by either side will result in penalties. Last, there are no significant forward
integration threats in the industry; however some capacitor makers now own small
portions of Ta mining companies to ensure the incentives are aligned. These aspects
combined indicate a medium level of power possessed by the Tantalum Wire industry
suppliers.
The forth force, Threats of Substitute Products, considers the affect on a product
demand due to the existence and cost of a substitute product. Substitute products affect a
product's price elasticity - as more substitutes become available, the demand becomes
more elastic since customers have more alternatives. A close substitute product constrains
the ability of firms in an industry to raise prices14 . The threat of substitutes in the
Tantalum Wire industry was concluded to be of high level due to the existence of
affordable capacitor alternatives and improvement in these alternative capacitors'
performance in recent years. Any substitute for the Tantalum capacitors will directly
impact demand for Tantalum wire products. In the past, Ta capacitors were considered
far superior to all other capacitors in all performance, quality & reliability indicators 15
However, with recent advances in technology, other types of capacitors are now
considered fair alternatives to Ta capacitors: the main competition comes from Ceramic
and Aluminum capacitors. Both Ceramic (also known as 'MLC': Multi Layer Ceramic)
and Al capacitors have bridged some of the performance gaps & are now competing head
to head in some fronts versus the Tantalum capacitors. Ta capacitors are still unbeatable
at longevity, volumetric efficiency (i.e. space) and reliability' 6 . Chart 8 below describes
the Ta capacitors struggle with its competitor products, indicating that the Ta capacitor
market is facing a tough competition from several alternative products in parallel, all
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trying to gain market share from Ta capacitors. This of course reduces the overall Ta
capacitors share of the pie'.
Chart 8: Global Consumption Value for High Capacitance Capacitors
In addition to the performance overlap with other capacitors, the competing capacitors all
use cheaper raw materials than the Ta capacitors - this is due to the fact that Ta is a rare
metal and thus more expensive, while other capacitors use cheaper raw materials such as
Aluminum, Nickel, Copper, and Niobium. Chart 9 describes the cost difference in raw
materials between the different capacitors, which leads to a significant difference in the
market prices for these alternatives - as of 2005 the price of a Tantalum capacitor was
almost three times the price of an Aluminum capacitor.
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Chart 9: Comparison of raw materials cost in different capacitor types
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These aspects combined indicate a high level of threat posed by substitute products in the
Tantalum capacitor market, which directly influences the Tantalum wire market as well.
The Fifth and last force, rivalry among existing firms, considers how incumbent firms
strive for a competitive advantage over their rivals. Economists measure rivalry by
indicators of industry concentration - when a rival acts in a way that elicits a counter-
response by other firms, rivalry intensifies. The intensity of rivalry commonly is referred
to as being cutthroat, intense, moderate, or weak, based on the firms' aggressiveness in
attempting to gain an advantage. The level of rivalry within the Tantalum Wire industry
was concluded to be high, based on two major components reviewed below: the existence
of a price war, and the under utilization of current manufacturing firms. In the past
several years the Ta wire products have become a commodity, and as such are
undifferentiated in the customers' eyes. The only way for incumbents to compete in this
industry is over price. The entrance of the lower cost Chinese competitors into the Ta
wire industry resulted in a price war between existing firms, a war which ultimately
decreased profit margins for all companies due to increased rivalry 19. In addition to the
price war situation, the Tantalum Wire industry is regularly under-utilizing its
manufacturing capacity 20. Due to historical upturns (and perceived upturns) in the late
90's, many Ta wire manufacturers added capacity to their existing factories as well as
opened new factories. Since the market since downsized significantly, the supply chain
was left with a lot of excess capacity and un-utilized equipment on floor. The current
average utilization for Ta wire across all firms stands on 68% which is relatively low 1
Since adding this wire manufacturing capacity required a significant fixed cost
investment in equipment and floor space, the competition intensifies between rivals in the
Ta wire market to gain volumes and market shares in order to compensate for their
investments with additional volume. These aspects combined indicate a high level of
rivalry within the Tantalum wire industry firms.
Porter's Competitive Forces Model is a well defined part of strategic analysis and market
attractiveness. By combining the separate analysis above of the five forces in the context
of the Tantalum Wire industry, it indicates a low market attractiveness level as a whole.
Based on Porter's framework, the low level of attractiveness is true for incumbent firms
currently in this market.
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In the next section I will evaluate what actions H.C. Starck can take to improve their
position in this challenging market based on Porter's academic literature frameworks and
the company capabilities.
2.6 H.C. Starck Strategic Responses
2.6.1 Literature Benchmark: Michael Porter's Framework
If one of the primary determinants of a firm's profitability is the attractiveness of the
industry in which it operates, an important secondary determinant is its position within that
industry. Even though an industry may have below average profitability, a firm that is
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optimally positioned can generate superior returns
A firm positions itself by leveraging its strengths. These strengths ultimately fall into one
of two headings: Cost Advantage or Differentiation2 3 . By applying these strengths in either
a broad or narrow scope, three generic strategies result: cost leadership strategy,
differentiation strategy, and focus strategy. These strategies are applied at the business unit
level. They are called generic strategies because they are not firm or industry dependent.
The following table illustrates these three generic strategies based on Porter's framework:
Chart 10: Porter's generic strategies table2
These three generic strategies will be briefly reviewed below with a description of the basic
requirements that a firm must possess in order to pursue each strategy. Then, an analysis of
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H.C. Starck's best strategy will be described along with the reasons why that specific
strategy was chosen.
The first generic strategy, a Cost leadership strategy, calls for being the low cost producer
in an industry for a given level of quality. The firm sells its products either at average
industry prices to earn a profit higher than that of rivals, or below the average industry
prices to gain market share. In the event of a price war, the firm can maintain some
25profitability while the competition suffers losses . Some of the ways that firms acquire
cost advantages are by improving process efficiencies, gaining unique access to a large
source of lower cost materials, making optimal outsourcing and vertical integration
decisions, or avoiding some costs altogether. Firms that succeed in cost leadership often
have specific internal strengths such as access to the capital required to make a significant
investment in production assets (this investment represents a barrier to entry that other
firms may not overcome), skills in designing products for efficient manufacturing, high
level of expertise in manufacturing process engineering, efficient distribution channels (i.e.
cheaper than competition), and an ability to purchase raw materials at lower cost. The low-
cost strategy also carries some risks; for example, other firms may be able to lower their
costs as well. As technology improves, the competition may be able to leapfrog the
production capabilities, thus eliminating the competitive advantage.
The second generic strategy, a Differentiation strategy, calls for the development of a
product or service that offers unique attributes that are valued by customers and that
customers perceive to be better than or different from the products of the competition 26
The value added by the uniqueness of the product may allow the firm to charge a premium
price for it. The firm should strive for the higher price to more than cover the extra costs
incurred in offering the unique product. Because of the product's unique attributes, if
suppliers increase their prices the firm may be able to pass along the costs to its customers
who cannot find satisfactory substitute products easily. Firms that succeed in a
differentiation strategy often have specific internal strengths such as access to leading
scientific research, highly skilled and creative product development team, strong sales team
with the ability to successfully communicate the perceived strengths of the product, and a
corporate reputation for quality and innovation. They may also possess a stronger
knowledge of the market. The risks associated with a differentiation strategy include
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possible imitation by competitors due to challenging IP issues and changes in customer
tastes.
The third generic strategy, a Focus strategy, concentrates on a narrow segment and within
that segment attempts to achieve either a cost advantage or differentiation. The premise is
that the needs of the segment can be better serviced by focusing entirely on it2 7 . Firms that
succeed in a focus strategy are usually able to tailor a broad range of product development
strengths to a relatively narrow market segment that they know very well. Some risks of
focus strategies include imitation by a competitor and changes in the target segments.
The following section will review the recommended generic strategy for H.C. Starck in the
Tantalum Wire business.
2.6.2 Analysis of H.C. Starck Options In Light Of Porter's Generic Strategies:
In the case of H.C. Starck in the Tantalum Wire industry, the business unit is targeting a
broad scope (i.e. industry wide domination in Tantalum Wire) and not a narrow market
segment. Therefore, Starck's competitive advantage can only be either 'low-cost' or
'product uniqueness' (also known as 'perceived quality'). Any other form of
differentiation will ultimately fall in one of these two categories. The following section
will examine both options and identify what strategy Starck needs to execute in order to
survive in this industry.
H.C. Starck cannot achieve industry-wide cost leadership as a sustainable competitive
advantage, for several reasons: First, Starck's core cost structure is not lower than that of
the competition - especially the Chinese companies that have entered the market in the
past several years. These companies have an inherited lower labor rate than in the US as
well as some more flexibility in purchasing Ta raw materials from The Congo due to less
social restrictions, and therefore have a lower cost structure to begin with, one that will
be almost impossible for Starck to compete with (current estimates of this cost advantage
are more than 15%). Second, H.C Starck Tantalum Wire business is currently struggling
and does not have access to any significant capital investment in production assets (as
opposed to R&D investments). Starck management does not want to invest its capital in
the Newton site manufacturing assets. Third, many of Starck's customers are overseas
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(i.e. Asia) and require a more expensive shipping process, in which case Starck does not
have an advantage over competitors.
H.C Starck's competitive advantage must therefore come from the 'product uniqueness'
attribute. This is achievable for several reasons: First, since its foundation, H.C. Starck
(previously NRC) was known as a leading force in the research and development areas,
and also achieved significant success in these fields. In fact, H.C. Starck owns many of
the patents related to Tantalum Wire that were submitted throughout the years, and was
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always regarded as a technology leader . Second, before Ta wire became a commodity
product, customers differentiated Starck's product based on their high quality and high
service levels29 . This is not the case today since the product is a commodity and all
competitors supply similar-quality products that are undifferentiated. Third, H.C Starck
has good networking connections to relevant academia researchers and maintains strong
connections to ongoing research fields in the US 30 .
In light of the above analysis of H.C. Starck's options, the best strategy for Starck to
pursue is a Differentiation Strategy where they will focus on offering a unique product or
service that will enable a price premium. In this case, a differentiation strategy in the Ta
wire business means developing the 'next generation Ta wire product' that will be more
technically advanced than the current Ta wire products in the market, more efficient in
terms of Tantalum usage (less Ta = lower production cost), and will enable the next
generation Ta capacitors market by enabling the high capacitance Ta powders market (as
both are components in the Ta capacitors manufacturing process).
The following chapters will describe the actions initiated and pursued in the Ta wire
department in H.C. Starck in order to execute this differentiation strategy (which was the
focus of my project). These actions include first a new product development process
assessment and adjustment to the Ta wire development, second, data collection from
various sources to better understand the economical, operational, technical and financial
aspects of the new product development. Finally, it will include a decision-support model
development to analyze future product profitability in different market conditions.
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CHAPTER 3: APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK AT H.C. STARCK
3.1 Goal Of Framework
As was mentioned in chapter two of this thesis, there is a need for H.C. Starck Wire
department to develop and launch a new Ta wire product into the market quickly. A
standard product development process is usually structured around several phases that
vary slightly between different companies. A typical product development process should
include the following phases, as detailed in chart 11 below:
B eta EndC onc ept Feasibility D efinition Implem ertation /D eploym ent of
/TestingLife_
Milestone Reviews
Chart 11: Typical industry product development milestones
The goal of this thesis was to support H.C. Starck in the first two phases of the product
development life cycle above (the Concept and Feasibility phases).
These phases include conducting a comprehensive feasibility analysis that will have an
economic study (costs/benefits), a market study (market size and competition), an
operational study (impact to current operations) as well as a technical study (narrowing
down feasible technologies). My approach was to collect all relevant data and to model it
into a decision-support model that includes all aspects of the feasibility study. Such a
model was developed during my internship to simulate multiple scenarios resulting from
the current uncertainty in the market, and to forecast the proper response to these
scenarios. This decision-support model will help H.C. Starck wire department in making
viable business decisions with the new product development efforts, and will help
management better comprehend the risks and uncertainties in launching such a product,
as well as the possible rewards in terms of Return Of Investment (ROI) and Net Present
Value (NPV) analysis.
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3.2 Initial Decision Tree
The decision support model was developed to follow the decision tree faced by H.C.
Starck when trying to decide their product development strategy. Each branch on this tree
was later separately modeled with its unique parameters and fed into the model.
Chart 12 describes the decision tree that was the source of the decision support model.
Choose Technology
Go/ No Go Decision
/ Investment
NPV #1
Invesment NPV #2
Investme N#
NPV #4
Calculate future profit stream
after lost customers I
Chart 12: H.C. Starck initial decision tree
Granted, there are additional scenarios and decision branches that the company can
choose to explore but are not shown in the decision tree above, since the focus of this
thesis is the scenarios dealing with a strategic decision whether or not to launch a new
Ta wire product into the market, with the goal of 'product differentiation', given the
current market conditions in the industry, as described in chapter two using Porter's
five forces framework. All factors described above (in section 3.2) were modeled and
were fed into a decision support model to simulate real-life behavior of the Tantalum
wire market over ten years.
3.3 Modeling The Uncertain Tantalum Wire Business
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Since there are so many uncertainties in the Tantalum wire business, it is difficult to
model or simulate all possible scenarios. The model developed takes into account factors
that account for the most critical aspects of a new product development process, based on
the Tantalum Wire business structure at H.C. Starck. Chart 13 describes these key aspects
and the key inputs into the product development model.
Cost structure
Fixed Costs
Variable Costs
Capital Costs
Ongoing expenses 1
Price premiums
... . ..... -... .-
1Capacity c
Floor Util
onstr
Product mix
Sae 'oecasts
Market Share
Cost of Money
------------ Technology Source & Complexity
R&Dspending
aints Time to Market
ization
Chart 13: Tantalum Wire business structure and model inputs
3.3.1 Product Development Model inputs
In order to properly calculate each of the factors influencing the Tantalum Wire product
development process, detailed information about demand, capacity, pricing and expenses
is needed. Chart 14 shows a simplified list of model inputs. A more detailed overview of
model inputs will be described in the upcoming sections.
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Factor rnputs
-Market size world wide
- Powder to wire consumption ratio
- H.C. Starck Market share
- Customer adoption rate
Tantalum Wire Market -Future Market growth rate
- Manufacturing Capacity on floor
Tantalum Wire - Product mix forecasts
Operations - Production utilization over time
- Fixed Costs
- Variable manufacturing costs
- Forecasted R&D costs (both capital and
expenses)
- Profit margins per product
Tantalum Wire Cost - Cost of money (i.e. discount rate)
- Price per product ($Ilb)
Tantalum Wire Pricing - Prime premium forecasts
- Final technology sources chosen
- Complexity factors per technology
Tantalum Wire - Duration of R&D process per technology
Technology - Capital investment size per technology
Chart 14: Product Development model inputs
The following sections 3.3.2 to 3.3.5 will each describe in more detail the methods that
were used to determine some of the key model inputs, such as market demand, pricing
strategy, technology sources and costs.
3.3.2 Market Demand Forecasts For Tantalum Wire
Determining the Tantalum Wire market demand can not be done as a direct forecast,
since the demand for wire originates from demand for powder, in a certain ratio. In order
to forecast accurately the future sales of Tantalum wire (in Lbs/year), a series of other
factors needed to be determined first, such as powder market size, the competitive market
share for H.C. Starck, and available production capacity.
Chart 15 below describes the methodology that was used to determine the initial
Tantalum Wire market size for high capacitance products.
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Chart 15: High capacitance Ta wire market assessment
The Tantalum wire competitive market was modeled including H.C. Starck and all other
current competitors, as shown in chart 16 below. This table is linked within the model to
simulate multiple 'what-if scenarios with different Starck market share percentages and
their impact on future revenue streams and NPV.
t 1 6 12%
Total 330 3 100%
Chart 16: Ta Wire market competitive structure
As a result of the inputs above, the 'new wire' sales forecasts were derived for the new
product, as shown in chart 17 below.
New wire ANNUAL sales forecast
Scenario: (wire sales in lbs/year) 205 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
all average case 0 0 0 1,711 1,711 2,56 2,566 2,566 2,566 2,566
all best case 0 0 0 3,010 3,010 4,514 4,514 4,514 4,514 4,514
al worst case 0 0 0 634 634 950 950 950 950 950
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Chart 17: Sales forecast for new Ta wire product (for H.C. Starck)
In order to derive the forecasted sales of the current wire products (i.e. "Old wire"), the
publicly available marketing information was used with regards to the entire Tantalum wire
worldwide demand (published once a month) and the H.C Starck market share was used, as
well as the Starck Ta wire manufacturing capacity capabilities. Capacity utilization was
forecasted for every year (in a ten year forecast) and was then used to determine the sales
forecasts of the current Wire products. Some assumptions were made with regards to
customers buying decisions to buy both 'new' and 'old' wire in parallel to better fit their
wide product offerings. As a result of the inputs above, the 'Old wire' sales forecasts were
derived, as shown in chart 18 below.
Old wire ANNUAL sales forecast:
Scenario: (wire sales in Lbs/year) 2005 2006 2007 2000 2009 2010 2011 2812 2013 2014
all average case 9,515 8,962 9,714 8,606 9,985 9,665 10,227 10,818 11,439 12,092
all best case 9,515 8,962 9,714 7,307 8,686 7,716 8279 8,869 9,491 10,144
all worst case 9,515 8,962 9,714 9,683 11,062 11,280 11,843 12,433 13,055 13,708
Chart 18: Sales forecasts for current ('old') Ta wire products (for H.C Starck)
Ta Wire manufacturing capacity utilization was determined for all Tantalum wire products
(both old and new) to ensure operational feasibility under average line management
conditions. The utilization over time is described in chart 19 below.
Wire Capacity Utilization Trend
(all wire products, old + new)
90%
o 80%
70%
60%
50%
C 40%
30%
Year
-r- Wire Utilization
Chart 19: Ta wire manufacturing utilization trend - 10 year horizon
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As seen in the initial decision tree, there is also a possible scenario called "Do Nothing",
where H.C. Starck decides not to launch a new R&D project, and therefore not to develop a
new Ta wire product. This scenario means that Starck remains with the current Ta wire
product offerings. This scenario also results in the fact that some of Starck's current
customers looking to buy advanced Tantalum wire products will have to look for solutions by
other sources - either by the competitors (not very likely in the short term since none of the
competitors are currently advanced enough in developing the new wire), or by exiting the
market with some of the high-capacitance products due to lack of a compatible powder-wire
combination. An assumption was also built into the model with a 'penalty' to Starck for not
developing the new Ta product - this penalty is expressed by a portion of current customers
moving from Starck to other suppliers to buy their Ta wire, and as a result, some of their
Tantalum powder will be purchased together as a bundle. This penalty means that H.C.
Starck will experience lost revenues in its Tantalum powder business as well as in its wire
business, as these products are direct complements of each other. Since H.C. Starck considers
Wire and Powder two separate 'profit centers' and therefore they are treated as separate
accounting centers, the model takes this potential powder sales loss into account by
increasing the revenue penalty (i.e. decreasing sales) account for defecting customers. In fact,
by not launching a product development process and therefore not having a wire product
compatible with the most advanced powder product, H.C. Starck will be penalized twice - in
two separate profit centers. Since this decision support model was focused around the Ta
wire department it does not reflect the actual revenues lost in the Ta powder department aside
from the penalty discussed above for defecting customers. The result of the 'Do Nothing'
scenario in terms of sales is shown in chart 20 below.
"DO HOTHING" SCENARIO
Year 2005 206 7 2006 200 88 21 2012 2013 2014,
HCST Old Wire Sales volume(bs/p 9,515 8,962 9,714 1,746 7,988 7,732 7,670 8,113 7,435 7860
*Volumes are based on a 30% market share for Starck as an example.
Chart 20: H.C Starck forecasted sales volume without a new Ta wire development.
3.3.3 Ta Wire Cost Structure Analysis
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The current Ta wire cost structure was taken from the Wire department income statement
report for the first half of 2005, and then annualized to forecasts the entire 2005 costs. The
breakdown between fixed costs and variable costs can be seen in detail at appendix #1.
The decision of launching an R&D effort for the new wire product development has a
significant cost impact influencing several cost buckets, such as R&D expenses, capital
investment, and other related expenses. First, the R&D spending increase will be needed as a
first step to launch the R&D effort - starting day one. This spending includes the actual
development work that will require hiring a skilled team of people dedicated to new wire
development, and paying their salaries for the duration of the product development. Second,
a Capital investment will be needed as well; this amount refers to the one time investment
that will be required to purchase new machines, tools and utilities to start manufacturing the
new product in Starck. It was assumed that this purchase would happen towards the end of
the R&D efforts (i.e. in year 3 or 4 of the development process). This will of course increase
the annual depreciation spending (Starck uses a 10 year straight line depreciation method).
The size of the capital investment depends on the chosen technology source, as some
technologies will be more complex than others to develop. Third, there will also be an impact
to many ongoing expenses due to the new product development - examples are increased
marketing costs, increased spending for quality assurance and engineering, etc. These costs
will be higher for the first years of product development, and will go back to normal in the
long term (once new product is stable in the market). The Tantalum wire cost structure is
summarized in chart 21 below.
Ta Wire cost structure breakdown
(example of 1st year spendings assuming technology #3 chosen)
New R&D expenses
6%
General & Admin
costs
3%
Ongoing R&D costs Fixed Costs
Additional
Depreciation (from
Raw Materials capital investment)
43% 1%
Variable Mfg costs
18%
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Chart 21: Ta wire cost structure breakdown
3.3.4 Ta Wire Technology Source Analysis
As mentioned above, there are several options for a technology source for the new wire
production. These four technologies were derived as a result of a high-level literature search
screening process to narrow down the most likely technology sources for the new Ta wire.
Based on the literature search as well as the expert opinions of the HC Starck Wire technical
experts, the final list of four possible technologies was derived. To date none of these
technologies were proven to create the new Ta wire product and to solve current technical
issues. These four potential technology sources will have to be carefully studied and
evaluated during the R&D process, and one final technology source will have to be chosen
for the production of the new Ta wire. Since these technology sources are not equal in terms
of their complexity, proven success in other applications, market knowledge and experience
with them etc, each will require a different capital investment if chosen - as indicated in
chart 22 below.
R&D process Overall Final Capital
Probability of complexity complexity complexity investment
Technology source Nickname technical success factor: factor score needed
Technology 1 1 0.2 0.3 0.06 high $35,000
Technology 2 2 0.8 0.3 0.24 moderate $28,000
Technology 3 3 0.6 0.5 0.3 moderate $23,000
Technology 4 4 0.7 0.25 0.175 high $30,000
Legend
0 -- > 0.2 high complexity
0921 -->0.5 moderate complexity
0.5 -->1 low complexity
Chart 22: Summary of the four possible technology sources with their respectable
complexities.
In order to differentiate these technology sources from each other and to rank them properly,
they were each assigned several factors based on current industry and academia knowledge.
The first factor is the probability of technical success, which considers whether a technology
was ever tested before in the market, is there a solid proof of concept, how much
knowledge/research exist in the open market such as academia research studies, other
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companies using this technology etc. The second factor is the R&D process complexity,
which considers the complexity 'in practice' of the actual development process for Ta wire,
such as the probability a technology will require a longer R&D process to develop this
product, a possible need for additional R&D people with a greater level of unique skills/
specialties etc. Finally, each technology was assigned an 'overall complexity factor' score
that was ranked from high to low and a respectable capital investment size was derived for
each (this is also shown in chart 22 above).
3.3.5 Ta Wire Pricing Strategies
One of the greatest advantages for launching a new Ta wire product into the market is the
ability to receive a price-premium from customers for the new product. Since Ta wire is a
commodity product, any type of differentiation by the customers will be a huge advantage
to HC Starck. The decision-support model considers the range of price premiums Starck
can achieve by launching the new product into the market. Of course this premium will be
assigned to the new product sales only, while the current wire products will not get this
premium. Since there are so many different product sub-types in Ta wire (i.e. based on wire
diameter, temper, customer geography etc), the model includes a product mix input that
averages the entire Starck product offering with their respective current pricing. A detailed
list of product offerings by Starck can be found in the appendix. The price premiums were
estimated based on multiple factors, including past premiums for new products launched
into the market by Starck; company marketing experts estimates based on market
intelligence and demand picture for the new Ta wire product, and customers interviews
with regards to a new product launch. Chart 23 below describes the potential price
premium ranges for a new Tantalum Wire product.
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New Wire Price Premiums
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Chart 23: Ta wire pricing strategy: current & new product offering.
It is important to note that price premiums may change based on HC Starck's pricing
strategy changes in the future. For example, Starck may decide to match the price of
current Ta wire products to that of the Chinese competitors in order to gain market share.
This will mean that the absolute price of the new product will decrease as well. Starck may
decide to lower the price premium (percentage wise) for their new Ta wire products if they
feel the competition threat is increasing and would like to move quickly to gain market
share. The decision support model is modular and can support them in making such
decisions and indicating the economical impact of such a strategic change.
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Chapter 4: RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The following chapter will demonstrate key results and insights enabled by the product
development model discussed previously. Since the model can simulate an almost
unlimited amount of scenarios with multiple variations, several key scenarios were
selected as most likely to resemble the H.C. Starck business situation. This chapter will
first outline the metrics used to evaluate each scenario, then it will highlight key decision
points that H.C. Starck will have to investigate, and finally it will draw several
conclusions and recommendations for next steps.
4.1 Economical Analysis - Selected Metrics
The decision-support model that was described in chapter three was used to run multiple
scenarios with different variations in inputs. Each scenario was then analyzed for its
economical and operational viability, using metrics that are aligned with the ones used by
H.C. Starck accounting arm. These agreed upon metrics include Annual Profits, Net
Present Value of profits, and Return On Invested Capital. The first metric, Annual
Profits, is the gross profit forecasts (before tax) per year, as forecasted for the next ten
years. Profits were calculated for the Ta Wire "profit center" which is a financial entity at
HC Starck. The model calculates profits for the entire Ta wire department as a whole, as
well as individually for the new Ta wire product only, for informational purposes. The
second metrics, the NPV of Annual Profit, uses the company standard discount rate (4%)
to calculate an NPV for every year based on the absolute annual profits. The third metric,
ROIC_(Return On Invested Capital), is determined as positive at the first year where the
accumulated profits from the new wire product are greater than the initial capital
investment required. This indicator provides data on how long it will take to return the
initial capital investment based on the forecasted profits from the new wire only,
regardless of profits from current wire products.
4.2 H.C. Starck Decision Tree - Recommended Path
As illustrated in section 3.2, H.C. Starck is facing a decision tree in which the initial step
is to decide whether the Wire business will launch a new R&D process ('Do Something'
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Scenario) or remain with its current product offerings ('Do Nothing' Scenario). Using the
decision support model to assist with making informed decisions, the following sections
will review the results of taking different routes or branches in the decision tree, and their
impact on the company.
4.2.1 Launching an R&D Project - Decision Time
A case study comparing Starck Wire department financial situation with and without a
new Ta wire product in the market was analyzed using the decision support model. This
case study included the base assumption of a 30% market share for H.C. Starck on
average - which is the most realistic scenario based on market knowledge. A separate
analysis will discuss how gaining or losing market share points impact the result of this
case study. Chart 24 below demonstrates the difference in HC Starck profit stream based
on the decision to launch an R&D project or not.
New product
developed
New product
not
developed
2013 2014
Profit Stream Comparison -
Product Development launch benefits vs. 'Do Nothing'
Year
Chart 24: A comparison between 'Do Nothing' & 'Do Something' scenarios profits
(Based on a 30% HCST market share and the 'average case' demand scenario)
As seen in chart 24 above, it is clear that the 'Do Something' scenario is superior to the
'Do Nothing' scenarios (specifically for this case of 30% market share). Based on this
case study, Starck should choose to launch the new R&D project and develop the new Ta
wire product, with the intention of being first to market with this product. The company
management should be aware of the fact that during the first 3-4 years the Newton Wire
department will have to endure negative profits for several years due to the initial capital
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investment and R&D spending required. This trend will be reversed in later years once
the new Ta wire product is launched into the market and starts to capture revenues (exact
timing of this break even point is pending the R&D process duration - most likely will
start at 2008 or 2009). The 'Do Nothing' scenario also includes the profit penalty to HC
Starck due to defecting customers in later years (for both wire and powder), once
competition is able to develop the new Ta wire product and bundle both wire & powder
into a more attractive package for some customers - this is another reason for the large
profit stream difference. The accumulated profits discounted over a ten-year horizon for
both scenarios in the case of 30% market share validates this conclusion as well, as
shown in chart 25 below.
Comparing Do nothing with Do something scenarios: 30% market share
NPV of total
Total Profits Total profits profits Positive
Scenario new wire all wire (all wire) ROIC at:
Do Nothing (30%) $0 $3.67 $3.32 N/A
Develop new product (30%) $16.60 $55.01 $42.16 2010
Chart 25: Summary of accumulated NPV results for profit streams
(based on average case demand and 30% HCST market share)
4.2.1.1 Launching an R&D Project versus Gaining Market Share
An interesting case study arises when reviewing alternatives to the product development
case above. A similar decision was analyzed (i.e a decision to launch an R&D project)
with a more optimistic assumption regarding the HCST market share: the following case
assumes a 40% market share for Starck (i.e. a 10% growth from current market position).
This was then compared with the 'Do Nothing' scenario that assumes no new product is
developed. Chart 26 below demonstrates the profit stream difference as a result of the
more optimistic market share assumption. New product
Proft Sreamcomarisn -developed at 30%Proft Sreamcomarisn -market share
New product at 30% MS vs.' Do Nothing' at 40% MS
$10.00-
$8.00
$6.00
S $4.00 4
S$2.00
$0.00 4Z 'Do Nothing' at
-$2.00 ?- 5 06 0720 0921 0121 0321 40% market
Chart 26: A comparison between launching a new product and the 'Do Nothing'
scenario - with an optimistic HCST market share figure
Chart 27 indicates the results of the discounted profit streams from the above case study
when comparing them to the base scenario on a ten year horizon.
Comparing Do nothing with Do something scenarios: 40% market share
NPV of total
Total Profits Total profits profits Positive
Scenario new wire all wire (all wire) ROIC at:
Do Nothing (40%) $0 $54 $45 N/A
Develop new product (40%) $17 $117 $94 2010
Develop new product (30%) $16.60 $55.01 $42.16 2010
Chart 27: Accumulated NPV figures in comparing different market share cases
From charts 26 and 27 above it was concluded that gaining a 10% increase in market
share points has a critical impact on the department profit stream - and may even change
the decision to launch the R&D project. The total NPV across 10 years is in fact higher
without the product development launch if the company is able to gain 10% of market
share - however looking at the annual profit stream it is evident that the annual profits
decrease over time (due to defecting customers penalty and no price premiums), while in
the case of developing the new product but maintaining a stable 30% market share the
annual profits increase over time despite the fact that the first years will have a negative
annual profit due to the initial investment (both capital & expenses). It is hard to
conclude what will be the better option to pursue for HCST in this case, since the
accumulated NPV figures are pretty close. However, HCST should take into account
additional factors on top of the total NPV - especially their confidence level in their
ability to gain a 10% market share and meet the 40% figure - this is a huge challenge,
especially with the tough competition from China. Such gain in market share does not
usually come free, and the company will have to take several drastic actions in order to
pursue a market share gain. Such actions may include increased marketing efforts world
wide and branch to new customers, or cutting prices temporarily to win contracts - both
will result in higher spending and reduced profit margins, and therefore can not be
compared as 'apples to apples' to the base scenario. Based on current market situation,
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one of the only ways for H.C. Starck to gain significant market share without cutting
margins or increasing spending is when one of their competitors decides to exit the wire
market completely and therefore the market is left with fewer incumbents, each may gain
a portion of market share from remaining customers. This situation is beyond the
immediate control of H.C. Stack and can not be influenced from within. Another possible
way for Starck to gain market share is again beyond their control and involves a dramatic
change in the cost structure of their competitors - most likely caused by a change in raw
materials prices going up. In such a case, H.C Starck will be better protected due to its
long term contracts with the Tantalum mining companies, as opposed to the Chinese
companies relying on the volatile and risky spot market. If Tantalum prices go up (for
example, due to a natural cause leading to a supply shortage), the cost advantage by
Starck's competitors will be partially reduced, and may enable Starck to gain market
share points with no significant actions on their behalf. However, none of these case
studies can be influenced by H.C. Starck directly and therefore are extremely risky to rely
on. If HCST estimates the feasibility of getting to 40% market share as 'high risk' as
described, then a better business decision is to launch the R&D project while committing
to maintain the current 30% market share. They should also consider their confidence in
the long-term market forecasts (7-10 years) versus the shorter-term market forecasts (1-5
years), the spread of the annual profits over time (increasing trend of decreasing trend)
and their current financial situation (ability to invest money upfront). The
recommendation in this case would be to choose the product development strategy over
the 'market share gain' strategy, since this will give HCST a more sustainable
competitive advantage in the long term, and not just a temporary advantage.
4.2.1.2 'Time To Market' Duration and its Impact on the R&D Decision
Another factor in making this decision is HCST's confidence level in the duration of the
R&D project from start until product launch (i.e. 'Time to Market'). The current best
estimate stands on three years for this duration - however complexity of the technology
chosen and unforeseen limitations (such as shortage in resources availability) may change
this duration. Chart 28 below compares the 'Do Nothing' decisions with varying market
shares to an R&D project that lasts one year longer than originally expected (i.e. four
years of development versus three years).
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Comparing Do nothing with Do something scenarios: 4 years to launch
NPV of total
Total Profits Total profits profits Positive
Scenario new wire all wire (all wire) ROIC at:
Do Nothing (30% MS) $0 $4 $3 N/A
Do Nothing (40% MS) $0 $54 $45 N/A
Develop new product (4 yrs) $12 $55 $42 2012
Chart 28: Comparing scenarios assuming 'Time To Market' is 4 years.
As chart 28 above indicates, even with a four year 'time to market' duration the product
development decision is still superior to the 'Do Nothing' case if HCST maintains its
current 30% market share. However, if HCST is able to gain market share and reach the
40% point, then the difference between launching an R&D project or not is not
significant financially - and in fact, the total 10-year NPV is slightly higher in the 'Do
Nothing' case (although the spread of the profits across the 10 years is different). Again,
as discussed in section 4.2.1.1 above, the confidence level of gaining a 10% market share
is very high and mostly uncontrollable by H.C. Starck, and therefore should be
considered as a high risk decision despite potential financial rewards.
4.2.2 Optimizing the R&D Process - Prioritization
If HCST decides to go ahead and initiate the R&D process to develop the new wire
product (as recommended above), the next step for HC Starck will be to choose a
technology source (out of the four technology sources identified). While this stage can
only be accomplished during the R&D process via testing and elimination, and will
require the actual R&D team to be hired to complete this stage, the decision-support
model can be used upfront to prioritize the four technology sources based on their
forecasted economic potential. This economic potential (as expressed by the profit
streams and ROIC metrics) should be used by the R&D team to rank the four
technologies in terms of development work and timeline. One possible prioritization
method that can be implemented should be based on the technology source that would
yield the best economic results long term if technically feasible. In this method, the first
technology to be studied and investigated in the R&D process should be the most
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profitable one. Granted there may be technical limitations and reasons why a specific
technology source will be scrapped and eliminated (unacceptable product performance,
for example), however the order of which to test and study these technologies is critical
since it will most likely be done sequentially and not in parallel. Chart 29 below
summarizes the economic potential of the four different technology sources as resulted
from the decision support model. The names of these technologies were disguised due to
confidentiality reasons.
NPV potential per technology
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Chart 29: A comparison between economic potential of all technologies
From chart 29 above it can be concluded that the R&D process could be prioritized based
on the following rank, in terms of time investment and work order:
1. Technology #3
2. Technology #2
3. Technology #4
4. Technology #1
This may have multiple implications on the actual R&D process, such as focusing on
hiring the best R&D team with sufficient skills and expertise in technology #3 (for
example, people with previous experience in this field, possibly from other applications
and/or from academia), and strengthening the academic ties with universities that are
currently researching this technology (initial literature search revealed such universities
exist in the US). This is not the only method to optimize the R&D process based on
upfront prioritization; other methods include a prioritization process that is based on time
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factors and not economical potential - for example, ranking the four technologies based
on the estimated duration to validate or eliminate it as a viable source. Such method is
feasible, however this thesis was focused on the economical aspects and such data was
not included in the model development.
In the next section I will draw several conclusions concerning the case studies reviewed
above as well as generic conclusions and recommendations for H.C. Starck to pursue.
4.3 Conclusions
The above sections highlighted several interesting case studies and scenarios from the
Tantalum Wire product development model. Although the model can be run to simulate
an endless amount of different scenarios, the above sections described a fraction of them
that bare the highest resemblance to the H.C. Starck business reality as well as several
key scenarios that posed interesting managerial and business dilemmas. The conclusions
drawn below are based on the financial and operational results of the model combined
with knowledge of the Tantalum Wire industry, the competitive landscape and the
organizational challenges faced by H.C. Starck. These recommendations were also
presented to the H.C. Starck Wire department management.
It is extremely challenging for any company to operate successfully in a low-
attractiveness market (based on Porter's five forces analysis results detailed in chapter
two). Surviving in such a market requires an incumbent firm to gain a sustainable
competitive advantage in order to be profitable32. Gaining that competitive advantage for
a company producing commodity products is especially challenging when the company's
manufacturing site is located in the US or in any other western countries mainly due to
the basic disadvantage in cost structure originating from the higher labor rates compared
to Asian countries and specifically China. Such is the case of H.C. Starck Tantalum Wire
manufacturing business. Other differences in cost structure may also be present in
addition to the labor rate difference, as in the case of obtaining cheaper raw materials due
to less limited social restrictions in China versus the US. Based on the work and research
completed in this thesis, H.C. Starck should adopt a 'Differentiation Strategy' that will
differentiate their wire products from the low cost competitors. In order to pursue this
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strategy, H.C Starck should launch a new R&D process with the goal of developing the
next generation Tantalum Wire product - a product that will partner together with
Starck's high capacitance Ta powder to enable the next generation Ta capacitors
production. Such a product is already sought after by Starck's customers (the makers of
capacitors) and will have a strong demand if launched to the market in the timely manner.
In order to gain the first movers advantage with the new wire product (thus enabling a
price premium), HC Starck should begin such R&D process very soon (recommended
start time is the first half of 2006). A later start date will cause a later product launch date
and will increase the chances of a competitor entering the market with a similar product
during that time. In order for H.C. Starck to account for the volatile Ta wire market and
the uncertain market and technology conditions, the wire decision support model should
be used as a tool which will help management make better informed decisions by
understanding which scenarios will result in a economically-viable business cases, and
which scenarios should not be pursued upfront. While the model itself should only be
used to assist in decision making and can highlight the best financial decisions, it should
be always combined with an understanding of the real-life actions that would be needed
to execute such decisions and the organizational impacts resulting from such actions,
along with the firm's confidence level in achieving these targets. H.C. Starck should also
seek to create a robust link between their product development arm and their business
arm. This link will enable organizational decisions to take into account both the technical
and the business side of the matter at hand and will result in a better, more informed and
data based decision-making process.
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Appendix 1: Detailed results of selected model scenarios
+ Scenario 1: R&D project launched, technology #3 chosen, 'time to market' varies (3-
4 years), demand case variations (average-best-worst cases), 30% Starck market
share.
..............................
............. .... ... . . . . ...... -
2007
2008
2009
x 2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total:
Year
NPV of
Annual Profits Annual prof Annual profits
new wire all wire (ail wire) -
Positive
ROI at:
2005 -$1.37 -$0.31 -0.31
2006 -$2.37 -$2.42 -2.32
2007 -10.78 -$2.11 -$1.95
2008 -0.23 $0.44 $039
2009 $098 $3.57 $3.05
2010 $098 $450 $3.70
2011 $0.98 $5.47 $433
2012 $0.98 $6.50 $4.94
2013 $0.98 $7.58 $6.54
2014 $098 $8.71 $6.12
Total: F 10 313 23A4RI__ _ _ _ _ ___._ _ _ __.7.
Year
Annual Profits
new wire I
Annual profitsI
all wire
NPV of Annual
profits (all
wire)
...... .... . . . ... ........ ............ .......... ........
Positive
ROI at:
2005 -$1.37 10.31 -10.31
2006 -2.37 -$0.69 -50.66
2007 -$0.78 -$0.24 -10.22
2008 -0.78 $2.42 $2.15
2009 -$0.23 $5.72 $4.89
2010 $3.56 $7.24 $5,96
2011 $356 $833 $6.58
2012 $356 $9.46 $7.19 x
2013 $356 $10.66 $779
2014 $356 $11.92 $8.38
Total:
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................ ....................... ..... ..... ...  ................. ... .............
............ .............. ......................... 
  ..........................
.... .. ..
.. ..... ....... ....... ........  ..... ......... ....   ..
........................
12.26 154.52 mm_ W
* Scenario 2: R&D project launched, technology #1 chosen, 'time to market' varies (3-
4 years), demand case variations (average-best-worst cases), 30% Starck market
share.
Annual profits
all wire
-$0.31
.......................   .............................   .....
............ .............................. ................  
......................................... ...... ..... ... . ... .. .. .............. ..... .............. ..... ..... .  
........  ........... . ...................   ............................. ................... ...... ... 
NPV of Annual
profits (all
Wife)
-$0.31
-$2.49 -12.54 -$2.44|-$0.90 -$2.23 -$2.06
18.32 $0.28
Positive
ROI at
2009 $0.86 5345 $295 2009 -$0.
2010 Wl.86 $438 $3.60 2010 34
2011 $0.86 $535 $4.23 2011 $3.
2012 586$6.38 $4.85 2012
2013 $0-86 $7.46 $5,45 2013 1$3
2014 $0.8 59 $.04 2014 $3
Total: -1.10 30.85 Total: IJ
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..................... ... 
.......................... ... ..... .. .... ... ........ .. .........
..................  ..........................   .............. ........ ...... ............ .
---------- 
-------------------------
* Scenario 3: R&D project launched, 'time to market' varies (3-4 years), demand case
variations (average-best-worst cases) - 40% Starck market share.
Annual Profits Annual profits Annual profis Positive Anaf Profis Annual profits pri
new wire all wire (all wire) ROt at: Year new wlre all wire WI
-1.37 -SI).31 -$0.31 2095 -51.48 -$0.31 -5
-$2 37 $5 p7 $4 87 2006 -$2 49 $4 95 54
-$0 78 56D $5 5 20 -09 5 8
-$0 23 9 5 $ 0 2008 -SI335 E& 93 $
$35 1372. $11 73 2009 :344 $15]60 $1
$ 6 $15.60 $12 41 X 2010 f44 1 9 1$3.56..1.6... $130 2011 E44 $1 43. 1
$3 5 $17 4 $13 22 2012 $34 $17 28 $:
$ $17.40 $12171 2013 43 4 $17 2B $1
$35 17.40 $12 22 2014 $34 $17 2 1
16.60 117.38 _9__.___ Total: 15.40 116.30
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Appendix 2: 'Do something' scenarios summary - profit stream
comparisons
(R&D project launched)
Summary of results from selected scenarios, all assuming the R&D project to develop the
new Ta wire is launched and initial investment was made as needed:
Profit stream comparison:
technology #3 scenarios
$14.00
$12.00
$10.00
$8.00
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$0.00
-$2.00
-$4.00
Best Case
Avg Case
Worst Case.
Chart 30: A comparison of profit streams based on average-worst-best case
scenarios
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